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INTRODUCTION
In this Reply Brief, Carolyn Boies shall show that the
Defendant/Respondent Cass Bettinger's Brief has failed to address
the issues before the Court based upon the evidence submitted at
trial, has not employed legal arguments applicable to the issues
on appeal and has generally failed to rebut the legal arguments
and evidence relating thereto presented by Carolyn Boies on each
point.

Mrs. Boies has clearly and adequately demonstrated that

the trial court erred when modifying the Decree of Divorce on
April 21, 1987.
This Brief shall address the legal arguments presented
by Cass Bettinger in the order in which each argument is raised
in Respondent's Brief.

==sa^

A COURT'S MODIFICATION OF A DECREE OF DIVORCE
MUST BE SUPPORTED BY A SHOWING OF "SUBSTANTIAL
CHANGE IN CIRCUMSTANCES" AND FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The Utah Supreme Court, on several occasions, has held
that a modification of a Decree of Divorce must be supported by
a showing of the moving party that there has been a
change in circumstances."
592, 594 (Utah 1983).

"substantial

Christiansen v. Christiansen, 667 P.2d

After a showing of substantial change in

circumstances, the Court must enter Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law which shows that the Court's judgment follows
logically from, and is supported by the evidence.
Smith, 726 P.2d 423, 426 (Utah 1986).

Smith v.

Under Point I., parts A.

and B., Cass Bettinger argues that the lower court in this matter
was somehow exempt from these requirements.
The four arguments advanced show the weakness of
Hettinger's position and mirror the problems and confused record
in this matter.
Bettinger first argues that paragraph 1 of the April 21,
1987, Order, changing visitation rights could not be

construedas

a modification since the structured visitation schedule instituted by the Court was within the scope of
visitation."

"reasonable

(Respondent's Brief, p. 5, 6.)

However,

Bettinger's argument ignores the structured visitation

schedule

previously ordered by the Honorable John Rokich, September 25,
1985, after a two-day trial on the issue concluding February 1,

1985.

The issue of "reasonable visitation" was not before the

Court and the change in visitation was a modification of the
September 25, 1985# Order modifying the qriginal Decree of
Divorce.

paragraph 4 of the April 21, 1987, Order did nothing more than
give legal construction to paragraphs 7 and 8 of the original
Decree and, therefore, was not a "modification" of the Decree.

u>>o*^«

The argument totally ignores the evidence presented and positions
taken by the parties before the Court.
the major issue between the parties.

This issue was clearly

Prior to the April 21

hearing, each party repeatedly presented argument on the issue
and memorandum in support of their position.

The Court's April

21 Order ultimately resulted in a significant change in financial
circumstances between the parties and the court erroneously
setting aside a judgment in favor of Mrs. Boies for past due
child support.

The impact of the Court f s Order was a significant

change of the original Decree of Divorce which did not rely on
the evidence before the Court.

The Court's order on the issue

warranted entry of findings and conclusions as a decision of a
substantial point in controversy between the parties.
The third argument advanced is that Mrs. Boies waived
objections to the Court's failure to enter Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law on its Order since it was not raised before
the lower court.

(Appellant's Brief, p. 6.)

Although the

"waiver" argument simply is not applicable, the best reply is
that failure to enter Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on
a modification of Decree of Divorce is properly raised on appeal.
Marchant v. Marchant, 743 P.2d 199 (Utah App. 1987).
The final argument raised by Bettinger is that the
court's interpretation of paragraphs 7 and 8 was made as a matter
of law which exempted the court from entering Findings and
Conclusions thereon.

However, where the Court goes beyond the

four corners of the document for its interpretation, i.e.
receiving additional evidence in the form of Affidavit from Mrs.
Boies, and Memorandum of Points and Authorities submitted by the
respective parties, the Court's interpretation is appropriately
based on matters other than intent gleaned from the wording of
the Decree.

Utah Valley Bank v. Tanner, 636 P.2d 1060, 1061-2

(Utah 1981).

The Court's final determination on the issue, as

with all other significant issues raised at trial court, must be
supported by Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law unless the
f^cts in the recordare "clear, uncontroverted and capable of
supporting only a finding in favor of the Judgment."
Deliran, 737 P.2d 996, 999 (Utah 1987).

Acton v.

In the case before the

Court, the only evidence submitted on the point of intent of the
parties was Mrs. Boies Affidavit which is clearly contrary to the
Court's interpretation.

II.
THE COURT DID NOT ORDER VISITATION AS SUBMITTED
IN DEFENDANT'S APRIL 21, 1987, PROPOSED ORDER
The record reflects that the Court, when addressing the
issue of visitation, intended only that the Defendant's visitation be a "standard descriptive visitation commonly used in the
district."

(April transcript, lines 2-4.)

In the March 24, 1987, Order to Show Cause proceeding,
when addressing the issues of Defendant's visitation, the only
reference made by the Court to visitation is found at page 27,
lines 1-6 when the Court stated:
"I will enter a Cgpecif ic„iirder of visitation.
It is common that this Court enter Orders of visitation every other weekend and alternate red-letter
holidays and half of Christmas and six weeks in the
summer. I am willing to put all of that in an
Order if your counsel cannot otherwise agree. That
will be the specific Order of this Court."
Next, when considering the issue of visitation, the
Court stated in the April 9, 1987, hearing:
"So as you understand it then, the three issues to
be determined are first, visitation, which the
court indicated that it would follow if they needed
a specific Order of the standard descriptive visitation commonly used in the district."
(April 9, 1987, transcript, p. 5, 1. 25; p. 6, 1.1-4.)
Bettinger's attorney then argues:
"Thank you, your Honor. I think the Court's
correct on the matters that have been resolved. It
was my understanding, however, the Visitation Order
was basically every other weekend, alternating redletter holidays, six weeks in the summer and I had
understood a weekday evening during the week that

there wasn't a weekend visitation—a very brief
one, maybe on Wednesdays. That was my recollection."
(April 9, 1987f Transcript, p. 6f 1. 22-25; p. 7, 1. 1-4.)
The Court's next statement regarding visitation is:
"In terms of every other weekend, it is clearly not
possible for him to anticipate an opportunity to
utilize that amount of visitation nor is it consistent to think he is going to be here on the odd
week to have a Wednesday night or some other kind
of visitation. So what's really going to happen
here is, if these people are immature as they are
and they have shown, they are going to create confusion in the mind of a 10-year-old child, that, I
think will create a tragedy."
(April 9, 1987, Transcript, p. 15, 1. 7-15.)
The Court concluded the issue on visitation by the
following Order:
cific order."

"Now, on visitation, I will grant the spe-

(April 9, 1987, Transcript, p. 21, 1. 3.)

The Court's reference to "specific order" is that Order
normally employed by the Third District Court which the Judge
initially referred to at the start of the hearing (Transcript,
p. 6), when he stated:

"If they need a specific Order of

standard descriptive visitation commonly used in the district."
Any additional visitation which Defendant's counsel included in
the visitation Order is beyond the scope of that Ordered by the
Court and finds no basis in the transcript.

The Judge had simply

indicated that he would sign no other Order except that which was
a "standard order" as he understood that term in relation to the
Third District Court. No objections to the proposed Order were
necessary after th^^rial court judge indicated he would not sign
the Order.

III.
THE COURT'S ORDER INTERPRETING PARAGRAPHS 7 AND 8
DOES NOT REFLECT PRINCIPLES OF CONSTRUCTION
OR EVIDENCE BEFORE THE COURT
Cass Bettinger argues that the Court could determine the
intent of the parties from the plain wording of paragraphs 7 and
8.

Therefore, resort to extrinsic evidence was unnecessary.

(Appellant's Brief, pages 12, 13 and 14.)

However, a simple

review of paragraphs 7 and 8 of the original Decree of Divorce
makes that position untenable.
When this appellate court reviews paragraphs 7 and 8, it
will become clear that it is impossible to determine the intent
of the parties by the language of the two-paragraph order for the
terms involved.

There are several logical interpretations from

the language and the ambiguity cannot be resolved without
reference to extrinsic evidence.

In fact, if a literal reading

of paragraph 7 is argued for, the last sentence clearly indicates
that "two-thirds of the house payments" will be an additional
amount of child support to the Plaintiff since nowhere does it
indicate that there is a decrease in child support based upon the
occurrence of any of the enumerated events.
Cass Bettinger1s Brief engages in a series of arguments
based upon a variety of scenarios, none of which can be proven to
have been the case without resort to extrinsic evidence. For
instance, paragraph 1 on page 14 begins, "The parties could not
have intended the interpretation asserted by the Plaintiffs"

The only method to determine that the parties "could not have
intended" the language would be resort to other evidence to clear
up the ambiguity.

Logic, especially in the paragraph presented

by the Respondent's Brief, clearly does not prevail.
Next, Bettinger requests this Court to take a form of
judicial recognition of some theoretical situation when he
states:

"It is common knowledge that if a divorced woman

remarries, she thereby attains an additional source of support
through the earning capacity of her new husband."
may commonly be the case,
Court.

Although such

that was not the evidence before the

Also, judicial notice is simply not appropriate for facts

and assumptions regarding negotiations of a divorce Decree unless
supported by a legal presumption or other facts submitted on the
point.
Finally, regarding the Respondent's argument that the
intent of the parties is clear from the language of the Decree,
Bettinger argues that the language is somehow justified by some
alleged tax consequences considered by the parties. However, it
is unclear how the language of the Decree makes "adjustments for
pre-tax or pre-marriage tax consequences."

This is true in that

Bettinger continued to receive tax benefits for mortgage payments
on the house until it was eventually sold.
In conclusion, the Respondent presents no cogent
argument that the Court was able to divine the intent of the parties from the language of the Decree and that it, therefore,

followed the normal principles of document interpretation set
forth in Utah Valley Bank v. Tanner, 636 P.2d 1060 (Utah 1981).
The only extrinsic evidence befqre the Court on the
issue of interpretation of paragraphs 7 apd 8 was the Affidavit
submitted by Mrs. Boies. Mrs. Boies' Affidavit detailed the negotiation, tradeoffs and basis for the language in paragraphs 7 and
8.

That basis was that Mr. Bettinger desired to maintain the

home as an investment, but Mrs. Boies desired significantly
higher child support than originally agreed to. As a trade off,
Mrs. Boies agreed to lower the child support, allow Mr. Bettinger
to maintain the home as an investment by having a lien which
increased or decreased in value to the dat^e of sale and agreeing
to an increase in child support by two-thi|rds of the amount of
the mortgage payment upon the occurrence df one of the enumerated
events.

It must be recalled that the parties assumed the home

would sell in a relatively quick fashion and the parties would
reap some monetary benefit from the sale.
Mr. Bettinger submitted no Affidavit or other evidence
on the point except the proffer of counsel found in the March 24,
1987, transcript on page 4, beginning at line 25.
The court's interpretation was inconsistent with the evidence submitted and resulted in setting aside a judgment which
had previously been entered for past due child support in the
amount of $2,707.00. The Court's Order should be reversed and an
Order entered granting Mrs. Boies Judgment for past due child

support based upon the amounts set forth in Exhibit "A" or
Exhibit "B" of her primary Brief on Appeal.
DATED this

£Ct day of July, 1988.
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON

By
E^TAULWOOD
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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true and correct copy of the foregoing Appellant's Reply Brief
to Robert M. McDonald, Attorney for Defendant/Respondent,
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Salt Lake City, Utah

84101, this j £
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